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The birth of art criticism

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Next issue; History of art history

CFP: History of art history

Submission deadline 25 December 2011

This is an open call for papers for the next *Art History Supplement (AHS)*. The proposed general theme, **but not limited to**, is “*History of art history*”. Submission deadline 25 December 2011.

AHS publishes material, dealing with all time periods, methodologies, media, techniques and debates within the field of art history.

Contributions from any other science (social or not) corresponding to material culture are also welcome.

Refer to Art Histories Society website (www.arths.org.uk) for more information

Updated on Apr 22, 2012 by [ArtHS Editor](#) (Version 7)

A short interview with Michelle Lamunière

A short interview with Michelle Lamunière

Question 1

Michelle Lamunière, John R. and Barbara Robinson Family Assistant Curator of Photography at the Harvard Art Museums, you are the curator of the *Laurel Nakadate: Say You Love Me* exhibition. Could you please tell us, what exactly is the job of a curator? And, from your point of view – curating photography, video and contemporary art – is there any *Decalogue of the Curator* one could follow and abide to it?

Answer

In terms of organizing exhibitions, a curator selects and interprets works of art around a particular theme or subject. The role of the curator is to show work that sparks dialogue and informs and engages viewers about creative practices and ideas that hopefully expand one's perspective on art and on culture and society more broadly. I don't think there is a *Decalogue of the Curator*, but there are standard responsibilities, including caring for, acquiring, and researching collection objects in addition to producing exhibitions.

Question 2

We will, of course, see it while we visit the exhibition, but for those who cannot attend it for any reasons, could you please describe us the way video-art is being displayed in the first solo Boston-area exhibition of Laurel Nakadate,? More, what's the theoretical or museological concept or idea behind this exhibition? [Note: the exhibition is taking place in the Sert Gallery at the Carpenter Center for the Visual Arts, Cambridge, MA. The exhibition is a collaboration between the Harvard Art Museums and the Carpenter Center.]

Answer

Laurel Nakadate's videos, photographs, and films elicit strong reactions. She intentionally pushes the boundaries of voyeurism, exhibitionism, and exploitation. In many of the videos, which are the focus of the exhibition, Nakadate performs a Lolita-like role in a series of sometimes humorous, but frequently unsettling fictional vignettes with socially awkward, middle-aged men she meets through chance encounters. In others, she directs the camera while voicing the role of a predator or seductively performing for the viewer. Whether in front of or behind the camera, Nakadate is always in control; yet her intention is not to belittle her collaborators. Her videos are complicated, but ultimately empathetic, meditations on loneliness and longing. Eight of Nakadate's videos will be shown. The majority will be viewed on flat-screen monitors with headphones, one will be projected, and we will also have a three-channel piece on television sets.

Question 3

What makes Laurel Nakadate an artist; video artist and photograph? Could you please tell us in a few lines the qualities of her work through an art historical perspective?

Answer

Nakadate's work is part of a long-standing tradition of performance and self-portraiture in photography and video. She also appropriates such mainstream vernacular formats as photographic snapshots, and her work draws on social media in its resemblance to amateur performances on YouTube or reality television where there is no traditional narrative and improvisation is essential.

Question 4

What exactly is a “social museum”? Could you please give us its definition? And, what is its difference from being just a “museum”? I ask this question on the occasion of the forthcoming publication of your co-edited book with Deborah Martin Kao, *Instituting Reform, The Social Museum of Harvard University, 1903-1931* from Harvard Art Museums and distributed by Yale University Press.

Answer

The Social Museum is a historical collection in the holdings of the Harvard Art Museums. In the words of its founder Professor Francis Greenwood Peabody, the Social Museum at Harvard University was established to “promote investigations of modern social conditions and to direct the amelioration of industrial and social life.” Between 1903 and the 1930s he and several assistants assembled a collection of photographs and related graphic and text-based material that promoted the comparative study of social conditions and institutions, from health to housing, industry to government, education to crime, worker welfare to recreation, and race to religion—themes regularly presented in social economy exhibitions developed for world's fairs, as well as other social betterment displays.

Michelle Lamunière, thank you very much.

A goodbye to sentiment. Architecture reviewed by art critics; Proposal for an article

A goodbye to sentiment; Architecture reviewed by art critics Proposal for an article

In this article I want to deal with a theme that is connected to yet not identical with the theme of “the birth of art criticism”. In the 20th century, architectural criticism was practiced mostly by architects. However, at the same time there was a small group of art critics who had the courage to occupy themselves also with this theme. Besides painting and sculpture they occasionally wrote about a building or an architect as well. In the Netherlands this activity coincided with a debate that was held from the 1940s onwards about the function and nature of art criticism. Especially after the war, when abstract art became institutionalized in museums and schools and when a new kind of society was dawning the role of the critic was no longer “natural” and self-explaining as it had been before. The debate was focused on the question, if the art critic had to pass a judgment or rather provide the public with information. The coming about of this debate signalled the farewell to the practice of expressionist art criticism and its exchange for modernist art criticism. Where expressionist art criticism had focused on the transfer of emotions from artist to public with the critic as mediator, there the modernist critic fulfilled an informational role in the depiction of a linear line of progress going from the future to the past. In my article I want to analyse the consequences of this debate for the way in which art critics wrote about architecture. In what way did a criticism based on feeling and emotion influence the interpretation and judgment of buildings? What were the outcomes of the debate for architecture; was architecture at all a part of the debate? In how far did the modernist critique coincide with the canon of modernism as formed by writing architects?

Rixt Hoekstra
Deventer
November 2011

Riegl's concept of age-value and the challenge of historicism in art history**Riegl's concept of age-value and the challenge of historicism in art history**

In 1920, while reflecting on Alois Riegl's notion of the “Kunstwollen,” Erwin Panofsky suggested that “It is the curse and the blessing of the academic study of art that its objects necessarily demand consideration from other than purely historical point of view.”[1] Along the same lines, the present article suggests that this past-reality, which is *not only* historical exists in the form of poietic (made, produced, enduring, recollectable) things. The maintenance of this poietic reality is non-separable from the demand to render historical things meaningful or important, i.e. to endow them with value. The issue of the value of monuments stood at the core of Riegl's essay of 1903, concerning the modern cult of monuments,[2] which stands as the central reference point of the present essay.

It is therefore from within a web of art-historical discussions that the present essay draws its trail, trying to establish links with historiographical and epistemological debates. Thus doing, I try to point out some historicist traits of the history of art, as well as to search for a possibility of keeping the historicist demon under control, following Ernst Troeltsch dictum: „Geschichte zur Geschichte (zu) überwinden,“[3] Evidently, no way out of historicism is spared the demand to dive into historicism's own depths. I am going to take such a dive, in which I hope to hit a terrain from which it will be possible to conceive of a realist history. This approach could indeed be regarded as “positivistic in the widest-sense of the term,” to use Riegl's expression.[4] Riegl's realist history can be an example for a 'radical historicism,'[5] as Henri Zerner chose to characterize it, which is capable of handling historicism's necessary antinomies (that I will present bellow) head-on.[6] My diving-suit into the depth of historicism will be the above mentioned essay, in which Riegl reflected upon the modern occupation with things of the past. I suggest founding a corollary between Riegl's concept of art and his conceiving of history. I suggest that it is possible to apply

Riegl's dynamics of artistic perception to his observations regarding modern man's relation with things of the past. Viewing Riegl's conception of artistic-volition as carrying realist tendencies, I will show in what manner his treatment of past monuments can be understood in a similar manner.

Alois Riegl and neo-kantian realism

Riegl was working in fin-de-siècle Vienna, at the Institut für Kunstgeschichte and at the then Österreichischen Museum für Kunst und Industrie. He is considered as a key-figure not only in the formation of the Vienna school of art history, but also in the formation of modern art history at large. Riegl's historical investigations were intermingled with his engagement with museology and conservation.

Riegl's most known and original concept is the "Kunstwollen," artistic-volition. This concept, which is found till this day in a process of clarification, was furnished by Riegl as a methodic model adequate for the comprehension of pictorial works. According to Riegl, the Kunstwollen should account for both the productive *and* the consumptive aspects of plastic realities of the past; therefore an inquiry using the Kunstwollen as its main tool would neither be interested solely in the 'creation' nor in the 'viewing' of the artwork, but rather in the 'fact' which combines both. The Kunstwollen should neither be confused with the private desires of the artist, nor with cultural Zeitgeist, and not even with style. Instead, the Kunstwollen is that reality, that archimedean point as Erwin Panofsky had called it,[7] which endures *in the midst* of personal desires, Zeitgeist and styles, when works of art are produced.

Many refer to Riegl's Kunstwollen as a proto-formalist concept, i.e., as a concept pointing to the examination of artworks in strictly plastic terms of forms, lines and space. Indeed, Riegl tried to distill what he called the "historical grammar"[8] of the creative arts (bildende Künste). But this grammar of the Kunstwollen, if formalist, should be tagged a "realist formalism," because the formalism that Riegl discusses is rooted in art's relation to reality. Thus, art is not a self-referring system; instead it is caused as well as regulated by the contact between man and things of nature.

Riegl's art history can be viewed as sharing basic affinities with the philosophical work of the Austrian turn of the century neo-kantian realist Alois Riehl.[9] This neo-kantian realist reading of Riegl emphasizes the importance of things of nature, spatiality, distance and causality for his art history. This reading stresses the dynamics of distance between man and nature that stands at the center of the *Kunstwollen*. And this distance is articulated by Riegl in terms which can be found in the writings of Alois Riehl and his follower Carl Siegel, to whose work Riegl referred.[10] Riegl's *Kunstwollen* is sustained by the constant human drive to retain a unified perception of reality vis-à-vis a dynamic cosmos. Within the realm of optical perception, this unity (*Einheit*, *Zusammenhang*) is achieved by plastic works of art. The *Kunstwollen* holds two required elements- One is the effective objectivity of nature, the other man's urge to retain unity; this mixture characterizes also neo-kantian realism.

The well-known dictum of the kantian "Copernican" revolution was that experience (*Erfahrung*) relates to objects (*Gegenstände*), or to phenomena but not to things-in-themselves. Kant furnished the critical orientation of philosophy as the examination of the conditions of possibility of experience, lying as the transcendental and universal foundation of knowledge. Famously, the move of the neo-kantian movement was to implement Kant's dictum to the understanding of (social, historical) systems of knowledge. For Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert of the central south-western school of neo-kantianism,[11] knowledge is essentially divided between the natural sciences that establish general rules of experience (according to the transcendental conditions of apprehension of objects) *and* the historical sciences that do not produce rules but rather *description* of singular events. Both poles of human knowledge, according to the neo-kantians, are confined within the limits of the transcendental domain of conditions of experience, not reaching the terrain of things-in-themselves, nor of reality *qua* reality. Alois Riehl, the Austrian neo-kantian realist, tried to face that last problem. He insisted upon the inclusion, as well as the centrality of reality in the project of critical philosophy.[12] For Riehl, reality is approachable to thought because it is neither separated nor external to it- rather, reality embraces both thought and things. Reality *is* the unity and identity between "Das Ding an sich" and "Das Ich an sich." No true philosophy, according to Riehl, can give-up the

demand for a metaphysical concept of reality. Leaning on this a priori real (wirkliche) identity of mind and nature, knowledge of *the structures of reality is* attainable. And these real structures are no more subjective than they are objective; in fact both terms collapse into each other within the concept of reality.

I suggest that Riegl's Kunstwollen can be read along the same lines: The Kunstwollen, i.e. artistic-production, is dependent upon things of nature, facing and challenging human perception. In order for the Kunstwollen to be activated things of nature must be there in front of human perception and resist it. The Kunstwollen *is* the contact between man and things of nature, happening in the midst of the reality of apprehension. For Riegl as well as for Riehl, the contact of perception is a distancing between things and their knower; and this distancing consists of a tension between two modes of perception: A primary mode of perception, which Riegl called Haptic (haptische) perception and Riehl called close-seeing (Nahsehen), apprehends surfaces which are close to the body of the perceiver; and a secondary developed mode of perception, which Riegl called *Optical perception* and Riehl called Far-seeing (Fernsehen), comprehends spatial constructions and depth.

The reality of apprehension consists of the un-reconcilable conflict between the two modes of perception. Subjectivity, for both Riegl and Riehl, is a result of the distance between perceiving bodies and things of nature. Perception then is subjective, but it is also *objective*, as it carries the structures of reality. This objective-subjectivism or subjective-objectivism creates the deofmative nature of perception, as perception places difference where actually identity lies. Deformative perceptions, originating in the movement between the haptic and the optic, are ordered by the deeds and works of man, especially by works of art. Art then is not the expression of the "Idea" of beauty, its origin lies not in the fantasies of free imagination, nor is art interested solely in pure formal qualities of lines and colors. Instead, art is presented by Riegl as a therapeutic prosthesis, assisting in maintaining a cohesiveness between man and nature. The history of art is a continuous volition to form nuances and variations in the relation between the capacities of man and the resistance of things of nature.

The suggested affinity between Riegl's work and neo-kantian realism can serve as

the oxygen-tank in our dive to the ground of historicism; we can use the structure of Riegl's *Kunstwollen* in order to think about the problem of historical knowledge.[13] A *realist* conception of history would insist upon maintaining the past as a reality, at least partially resistant to subjective interpretation. As Erwin Panofsky wrote: "Why should we be interested in the past? [...] because we are interested in reality." [14] The "interest" in the reality of the past can be portrayed as a "historical-volition," which would work along the lines of Riegl's "artistic-volition": Historical volition manifests the contact between human apprehension and things of the past. Things of the past would be considered as real things of nature, synchronous to human apprehension; and any contact between the two supplies, necessarily, even if often latently, distorted-objective knowledge about the order of things of the past. In a continuous manner to the parallel relation between things and mind in neo-kantian realism, a parallelism exists also between the past and its subjects, a parallelism that perception seemingly deforms. In every contact with a thing from the past we immediately have at our disposal knowledge about its unifying structures, forms and rules. The work of the neo-kantian realist historian will then be to regulate perceptual-deformation of the past through the identification of its historical grammar of the past.[15]

The Historicist's cave

Let us return to our dive into the historicist's cave. The historicist basic assertion is that human existence *is* historical.[16] History then ceases to be a science and becomes a metaphysical paradigm, in which time and history are synonymous, and the past is internal to them both. History, says the historicist, demand a different kind of rationality than the one serving the natural and exact sciences.

Historicism's antinomy is thus constructed: On the one hand, historicism insists on the singularity of historical events, that never repeat themselves and obey no permanent rules; on the other hand, historicism did not decline its aspiration to supply an *account* of historical phenomena, which will enable a contextualization of the singular event, a contextualization which creates a holistic interpretative structure in which exists an organic

inter-relationship between a particular and a universal.[17] This holistic contextualization, stemming from the idealist, mainly hegelian conception of history, reached its height in the various models of universal history, with which Riegl was clearly familiar.[18] A realist history would try to tackle the historicist antinomy. A neo-kantian realist approach could declare that history is a mode of apprehension (*Wahrnehmung*) of reality, just as any other perception or knowledge. And any act of historical apprehension includes knowledge about the order of the things of the past. So in as much as for the historicist past and history are identical, for the realist historian the reality of the past includes not only history but also the real grammar of human deeds.

Around 1900 Historicism was a widely debated issue throughout the German intellectual micro-cosmos. Generally, the neo-kantians tried to resist historicism, but in most cases, as in the case of Windelband, their essays were not successful.[19] Numerous disputes evolved around the historicist viewpoint. One of the most known of them was the “*Methodenstreit*” between Gustave von Schmoller, which lead the German historicist national economy school, and Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics, whose relevancy for the work of Riegl was noted already by Julius von Schlosser.[20] Menger’s attitude was an *anti*-historicist, and a realist one- he argued that the science of economics should *deduce* the structural atoms governing the history of economics, as it cannot be satisfied with the *description* of the flow of historical phenomena.[21] I suggest that his approach was close to that of Riegl, and to what can be a neo-kantian realist conception of history.

This approach goes against the grain of not only historicism but also canonical neo-kantian distinction between the natural and the historical sciences:[22] For Windelband, the natural (or “nomothetic”) sciences distill general rules of phenomena, in as much as the historical (or “idiographic” sciences) describe singular events and their qualia.[23] For Windelband, as well as for Rickert, in as much as natural science produces ‘rules,’ History, or what Rickert called deliberately the *Kulturwissenschaft*, deals with *values* (*Werte*).[24] Values, according to the canonical neo-kantians, are the epistemic tools of history, and it is only through describing systems of values, or “*Weltanschauungen*,” that the historian can

state anything general regarding his objects. Windelband asserted that something has a value only if it occurs only once: “ [...] er hat nur Wert, wenn er einmalig ist.”[25] When we ascribe a value to a historical event, we pose the event as an expression of its organizing values. Values are the synthetic medium holding-together cultural organisms, thereby sustaining the historicist antinomy mentioned above.

Though efficient for that cause, neo-kantian values are ontologically problematic creatures, because they are non-realities. They are that endless task which is never fulfilled in actual concrete events. Rickert opens his discussion of value in his “System der Philosophie” thus:

"There is something, which is not real and yet is not nothing, and therefore (it) belongs to the world *as* the real (...) we must determine positively this not-existing something or the *non-real*." [26]

Values actually stands in the side of truth rather than in the side of reality, as Bruno Bauch, in his book *Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit* argued, explicitly stating that "Non-reality is the most obvious character of value as value." [27] In sum, in the canonical neo-kantian view, values, as the fundamental instrument of the historical sciences, may organize the world, but they are not real. [28]

'Values' in history, culture and economics

The German neo-kantians constructed the concept of value as a synthetic non-real, normative entity, responsible for sustaining and directing the cohesiveness of history. [29] The ‘school’ of value-philosophy in Germany stemmed from the early nineteenth century vitalist philosophy of Hermann Lotze, and was integrated into both neo-kantian and historicist discourses. [30] Ernst Troeltsch, the chief critical thinker of historicism, following Rickert, but acknowledging the importance of Riehl’s and Bergson’s work nonetheless, indeed suggested that the concept of value supplies the kern-point from which a way out and above historicist relativism is opened. [31]

In the Austrian intellectual milieu, Values were understood in a different manner,

which had nevertheless relation to the question of relativism in history. In Austrian thought throughout the nineteenth century, values were conceived as an analytical tool, *differentiating* between actions regarding things. Most Austrian writers on the theory of value took a realist attitude towards it,[32] meaning that they tried to locate firmly the practice of valuation in concrete human deeds, as well as to consider values as mental realities.[33] Here, values are more object-oriented than system-oriented; and in as much as neo-kantian values are unquantifiable, in the Austrian version value's principle function is to measure and to estimate. This realist approach to values is exemplified in an essay titled *Studien zur Werttheorie* of 1902, written by the Viennese art-historian Robert Eisler. In this essay, pointed-out by Julius von Schlosser as relevant to an understanding of Riegl's art history,[34] Eisler speculated a theory of history based on a realist, quantifiable definition of value.

The leading school of Austrian value-theory issued from Franz Brentano and his follower Alexius Meinong; this school searched to define values as mental realities.[35] As the content of emotion, valuation is considered as a passive mental reality, expressing an intention regarding the being of an object.[36] But as the content of will rather than of emotion, then it is considered as an active agent. This last approach to value, which emphasized its *volitional* nature, is apparent also in Riegl's text on monuments, as well as in Menger's writings on economics; but furthermore in Riegl and Menger valuation is portrayed as a mode of apprehension of things.[37]

In Menger's 1871 groundbreaking *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre*, a special chapter was dedicated to the theory of value.[38] For Menger, value is the outcome of a need (Bedürfnis) and its possible satisfaction (Befriedigung). Value is the importance, or meaning (Bedeutung) we ascribe to goods, when we are conscious of our dependence upon them for the satisfaction of our needs. Under this definition value is the product of a conscious gap between our needs and our capability to satisfy them.[39] Values then organize needs, based on the consistent uncertainty of human duration.[40] Riegl was also using "value" as an organizer of needs. But he furthermore concentrated on the manners in which values are responsible for the transfiguration of what has been done with a thing, into

what should or could be done with it. Riegl demonstrated how the activity of valuation determines what will persist of a thing, or to what segment of a thing we adhere. By selecting what will persist and what will be set-aside, valuation transforms the thing into an object.

What happens if the notion of value is no longer conceived as a synthetic non-real ideal (as in Windelband, Rickert and Bauch), but rather as a producer and a conservator of needs, wills and their satisfactions through the use of things; what concept of history will result from that? That history will be conceived as responsible for maintaining things in archives, in museums or in other memory-storages; maintained so we can return to them in order to satisfy various needs. And if the historian holds a responsibility of maintenance, then the art-historian even-more so, as his objects exist a-priori as things to be preserved, contained, protected, being ready to be presented, or re-presented, adored or appreciated. This responsibility for the maintenance of things can be used as a kernel for a realist conception of the history of art. Indeed, that point underlines the affinity between the activity of the art historian and the activity of the art-critic, in as much as both activities are responsible for the values of things.[41] But in as much as the critic is attuned to the use-value (Gebrauchswert) of the art product, the art-historian estimates the weight (or importance) a thing carries in handling of the past.

Art history, values and Riegl's 'Denkmalskultus'

The history of art, from the times of Vasari until at least those of Winckelmann and Riegl maybe more than any other historical discipline, has been related to goods. The artwork is not just a thing, but a precious, cherished thing. In marxist terms, the artwork is a commodity endowed with a surplus value, and the art-historian is responsible for the maintenance of the surplus-value of a work.[42] The value with which works of art are endowed itself aspires to be enduring, resistant to perishing. Art-historical value then functions itself as a storage-place for art-works. From that point of view, the work of the art-historian is a kind of an investment, an investment, motivated by values, which takes an

active part in the thing's duration. This investment process is being carried-out, as Panofsky suggested, by the diagnosis[43] of the artwork. Starting with dating, authorship and location of production, passing through questions of styles and schools, the art-historian borders questions of meaning, content or understanding, which try to pin-down the reality of the work.

All of the above issues are implicated in Riegl's essay regarding the modern culture of monuments. In 1902, Riegl joined the commission responsible for the re-organization of the treatment of monuments in the Austro-hungarian monarchy.[44] To that occasion Riegl produced an essay, which was published at 1903, as a part of a wider text which presented an 'outline for a legal organization of the treatment of monuments in Austria.'[45] The essay was titled- "Wesen und Entstehung des modernen Denkmalskultus." [46] In it, Riegl launched a typological examination of the values of monuments in modern culture.[47] In the very gesture of devising a typology of valuation of monuments Riegl was challenging one of the most basic dictums of the Viennese school of art history, determined by Moritz Thausing, namely that the history of art should be as separated as strictly as possible from explorations of taste.[48] By the very act of writing this essay, Riegl acknowledged that the work of the art-historian engages necessarily with practice of valuation. That was the orientation of Robert Eisler of the Viennese school, who understood that the examination of values is the examination of history itself, and that historical examination cannot function without values.

Riegl's essay involves the question of duration. Menger already related the concept of value to man's occupation with his duration, his possibility to continue to live and to satisfy his needs in the future.[49] Riegl's essay poses a more complicated durational structure, as monuments are things whose reality and usage originate in the past. Moreover, monuments are things that *carry information about the past*. So the duration that Riegl describes moves back and forth; it delves into the past while pushed by the present. And it is the practice of valuation which activates this durational-overlapping, in which the past pushes the present and the future pushes the past.

For Riegl, *any* produced thing from the past can be considered as a monument.[50] It can be a written-letter or an oil-painting. Furthermore, It can be a willed-monument (gewollten Denkmal[51]) which has intentional memorial value (gewollter Erinnerungswert), but it can also be a non-willed monument, like an architectural ruin, which is viewed as a testimony of a culture, community, practice or age. Otherwise put, Riegl was interested in the attitude towards the produced past in general. In aristotelian-vichian terms, Riegl's object can be called the poietic past. According to Vico, this poietic past can be known with certainty.[52]

Along the *Denkmalskultus* essay, Riegl distinguished between various values that characterize the modern culture of monuments, of which I will only discuss two: The one between *artistic-value* and *historical-value*, and the second between *historical-value* and *age-value*. The first differentiation, which is a conjunctive one, Riegl locates between artistic-value (Kunstwert) and historical value (Historische Wert). Artistic value is the value which measures the importance of the plastic visual components of the artwork, according to aesthetic ideals of beauty. *Historical value*, in its turn, concerns, generally, the works' place on a line of development. But according to Riegl, any human product from the past carries both historical and artistic values:

"Any artistic monument without any exception is a historical monument
(...) vice versa also any historical monument is an artistic monument."[53]

Riegl observed that for modern culture, historical and artistic values are essentially intermingled, because art cannot be viewed outside the line of historical development. Therefore artistic-values are deduced from and integrated into historical narratives. Therefore, artistic-values are conjunctive to historical-values. The consequence of this is not only that any historical monument is also an artistic monument, and also not only that aesthetic-description is always historically determined, but furthermore that all monuments, all poietic things, are essentially art-historical in their very reality, because every monument is potentially an artwork, and every artistic monument is necessarily also a historical thing. Thus, Riegl actually was establishing the platform for art history to become the historical

science par-excellence, and “Kunsthistorischen Werte” to be pertaining to all produced things.[54]

The second distinction that Riegl makes in this essay is a *disjunctive one*: On the one side of this second distinction we have historical value, and on the other side we have what Riegl called *the age-value (Alterswert)*. Age-value is rooted in the work's material reality. It measures the importance of monuments according to the *fact that they carry the materiality of the past*. Age-value, says Riegl, erupted from the Romanticist attraction towards the way nature changes, destroys and shapes things over time, an attraction which was embodied in the romantic cult of ruins. Age-value transfigures a work into a thing of nature, and it judges the meaning of the thing according to the marks that time and the forces of nature have been leaving on its surface. Age-value, then, relates to the durational reality of the thing, to the fact that a thing *has* a past, to the fact of its endurance. Though on first sight it seems plausible to affiliate Riegl's typology of values of monuments with Friedrich Nietzsche's known typology of history-writing, I suggest that we also be aware to the difference between the two typologies: Neither Nietzsche's ‘antiquarian history’ nor his ‘monumental history’ are wholly equivalent to Riegl's age-value; Nietzsche's antiquarian history is based on the craving for the original, in as much as Riegl's age-value displays interest in the *changes* that the original has been going through; furthermore Nietzsche's monumental history is the voluntary history of winners, in as much as Riegl's monument imbued with age-value can be rather a non-willed monument, and it relates more to decay and destruction than to victories.[55]

Because age-value measures gratification from decay and deterioration, it aspires to preserve a thing-of-the-past *as a* thing of the past, and so if a thing is endowed with an age-value we will be reluctant to have it go through processes of restoration. Age-value demands that the thing which carries it should be conserved rather than restored. The age-value does not preserve an “original” existence of the thing, but rather the reality of its survival *through* the ages. Riegl indeed favored the age-value as the determining factor in the decisions we take concerning monuments, and his approach was the starting point for a debate regarding this question in the 20th century, notably by Georg Dehio.[56] Restoration, Riegl argued, is

always carried-out according to pre-conceived present historical or aesthetic schemes, which all originate in values-of-the-present, or “Gegenwartswerte”. All these, writes Riegl, are inherently subjective or even “egoistic” [egoistischen] ones.[57] Riegl’s stand was that the preservation of monuments should defend the work’s age-value against all the values that try to appropriate the monument according to the needs of the present, including historical-value:

"The target of the law for the protection of monuments in Austria is the protection of the age-value not only against misunderstanding and harm, but against all the other concurrent values, especially the present-oriented values."[58] (...) "The future care of monuments should be based on the cultivation of age-value, which leans on the observable marks of the age. The highest worry of future care of monuments should be to arrange itself by the marks of the age, and thereby [it] must leave aside the postulated style-origin and unity of style, being both held high and above the marks of the age by the cultivations of historical-value and the newness-value."[59]

Age-value and the reality of the past

The Alterswert is most time resistant to the use-value as well as to the artistic-value of the thing. It is neither interested in knowing the rules of production, nor in the principle of the inner-unity of the thing. Instead, the will which directs the age-value intends to retain the thing in its duration, as it “really has been,” which is different from Leopold von Ranke’s ‘as it really was.’

The age-value is formed not only as a temporal structure but also as a spatial one. It forms combination of a haptic-perception, of the close presence of the thing, and an optic-perception, concentrating on the surface qualities of patina, dust, cracks and so forth. Haptic perception, according to Riegl, is the outcome of an intimate, tactile continuous and physical contact with a thing. The age-value can supply an account of the inter-relation of things with durational forces of nature, but it fails to contextualize it according to canons, perspectives and categories. And here comes the importance of historical value. Historical

value views the monument as a singular occurrence taking part in a developmental chain whose end is the present. Riegl explains:

"We call historical all that which once was and nowadays is no more; with modern concepts we add to that also the further intuition, that that which once was cannot be again and any thing which once was is an un-repeatable and un-replaceable member in a developmental-series (...) The core of any modern conception of history is the construction of developmental thought." [60]

This characterization of historical-value is similar to the characters of the historicist antinomy: on the one hand, a historically-valued thing must be singular and one-timely, on the other hand, it must belong to a general cohesive narrative of development. In as much as age-value demands the conservation of the thing, historical-value favors a restorative rationality, which searches to represent the thing's structure, as well as its place in historical development. The presence of the thing itself is not necessary for historical examination: a slide, a map or a photograph suffice. [61] Historical-value involves a distanced, perspectival, optical view of things, which helps to locate them in wider contexts.

Therefore, within the depth of historical-volition we find an antinomy which can replace the singular-holistic one. Conservation and restoration do not go well hand in hand, and we are constantly demanded to choose between the two. Within the framework of modern historical-volition, there is no solution to the dilemma between conservation and restoration. [62] Our relation to things is split between two wills: the one driven by age-value, the other driven by the historical one. Age-value is not easy to be disposed of, as it embodies the other face of the modern conception of things of the past. Naturally, art historians are interested in the historical-value of monuments. They cannot abandon the narrative of history, and historicism makes a constant, resistant element of the practice of the history of art. [63] When Riegl furnished a "historical grammar of the visual arts," he had been clearly working out of the platform of historical-value. Still, we can ask: what would be the effect of integrating age-value into our conception of history? At the beginning of this paper I've suggested to construct a notion of "historical-volition," parallel

in structure to Riegl's "artistic-volition:" Both volitions are modes of apprehension. In Riegl as well as in Riehl's writings, apprehension is divided between haptical and optical perception. In a similar manner, historical-volition is divided between age-value and historical-value. This dual structure that Riegl supplies a model for historicist antinomic rationality: On the one hand, the desire to adhere to the singularity of past-event, on the other, the need to put this event in some structure of sense.

Historical apprehension, under this suggestion, would be the movement of transference between the two kinds of value. In as much as age-value is intimately related to the durational physicality of the thing, historical-value is concerned with forming and maintaining a perspectival distance from the thing. And in as much as age-value preserves the physical proximity between a viewing subject and a thing of the past, historical value preserves subjective open-space [Freie Raum] between the viewer and the totality of history.[64] This abyss between age and historical value, which is opened within historical-volition is a point where historicism may crack from within, in a manner which finds a point exterior to itself, undermining its basic aspirations. The reality of the past consists of moments of transference between age-value and historical value, and a realist history would be occupied with the moments in which the two values cross and produce each-other. Things of the past would be positioned at the transference-point between the things' age- and historical-values. This realist history would examine a work's endurance through processes of formalizations, schematizations, by dogmas and habits of thought. That history would preserve that which endures processes of restorations: readings and codifications *are*, in this frame of mind, sheer forces of nature, and they transfigure a work's reality. This history would examine how changes in habits of thought have been carrying and at the same time destroying, shaping, a past thing.

As many realist endeavors do, this realist history would reverse the epistemological hierarchy; vis-à-vis a relativist, transcendental subject which knows and shapes the experienced world of the past, the reality of the past should be conceived as producing and shaping the historical subject. Things of the past regard and form us. In the practice, this history would always have to start with doxas and intellectual-habitudes, and proceed to

find-out the gaps in the historical categories and conceptualizations, gaps which are preserved by and in things of the past (i.e. works, deeds, thoughts). Age-value maintains the cohesiveness of historical-volition by limiting it. That value is endowed upon that which survives the sentences of history, preserved as something which we may know.

Adi Efal

[1] Erwin Panofsky, "Der Begriff des Kunstwollens," in eds. Hariolf Oberer and Egon Verhezen, *Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft* (Berlin: Verlag Bruno Hessling, 1964), 33; Erwin Panofsky, "The concept of artistic volition," trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder, *Critical Inquiry* 8/1 (Autumn, 1981): 18.

[2] Alois Riegl, "Der Moderne Denkmalskultus sein Wesen und seine Entstehung," *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Augsburg-Wien: Benno Filser Verlag, 1928), 144-93.

[3] Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* [1922], *Gesammelte Schriften*, 3 (Aalen: Scientia-Verlag, 1961), 772.

[4] Alois Riegl, "Naturwerk und Kunstwerk II," *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 64- "positivistische (im weitesten Sinne)." See Diana Graham Reynolds, *Alois Riegl and the Politics of Art History. Intellectual Traditions and Austrian Identity in Fin de Siecle Vienna* (San Diego: University of California, 1997), 48-71; Michael Gubser, "Theodor von Sickel and the Institute for Austrian Historical Research," *Time's Visible Surface- Alois Riegl and the Discourse on History and Temporality in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006), 77-88.

[5] Henri Zerner, "Art, Value and Historicism," *Daedalus* 105/1 (Winter 1976): 185.

[6] For recent discussion of historicism see *Journal of the Philosophy of History* (volume 4/2, 2010).

[7] Panofsky, "Begriff des Kunstwollens," 33; Panofsky, "Concept of artistic volition," 18.

[8] Alois Riegl, *Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste* (Graz: H. Bohlau, 1966), 129; Alois Riegl, *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts*, trans. J. E. Jung (New York: Zone Books, 2004).

[9] See Adi Efal, "Reality as the Cause of Art: Riegl and neo-kantian realism," *Journal of Art Historiography* 3 (December 2010), http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_183171_en.pdf.

[10] See Carl Siegel, *Alois Riehl- Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neukantismus* (Graz: Verlag der Universitäts-Buchhandlung, Lerschner und Lubensky, 1932); Wolfgang Röd, "Alois Riehl, Kritischer Realismus zwischen Transzendentalismus und Empirizismus," in eds. Thomas Binder, Reinhard Fabian, Uld Höfer and Jutta Valert, *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz, Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie* 32 (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopoi, 2001), 117-34; Heiner Rutte, "Ergänzende Bemerkungen zu A. Riehl, H. Spitzer, C. Siegel und zur Grazer Schultradition," in *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*, 135-48; Michael Heidelberger, "Kantianism and Realism: Alois Riehl (And Moritz Schlick)," in eds. Michael Heidelberger and Alfred Nordman, *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science* (Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press, 2006), 227-47.

[11] See Klaus Christian Köhnke, *The Rise of Neokantianism. German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism [1986]*, trans. R.J.Hollingdale (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[12] This an orientation Riehl shared with the psycho-physical experimentalist post-kantian philosophy of Johann Friedrich Herbart, Hermann von Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt Carl Siegel, *Alois Riehl- Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neukantismus* (Graz: Verlag der Universitäts-Buchhandlung, Lerschner und Lubensky, 1932), 10, 23-4, 33-4; Alois Riehl, *Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1903), 137-79, 256-65.

[13] This is a problem which Riehl, the neo-kantian-realist did not really tackle in a systematic manner. Nevertheless see Alois Riehl, "Über Begriff und Form der Philosophie [1872]," *Philosophische Studien aus Vier Jahrzehnten* (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1925), 166-9, 170- "In unserer Zeit ist die historische Methode vorherrschend. Sie befähigt, das Sein im *Werden* zu ergreifen, das Gestaltete in seiner Gestaltung anzutreffen; das Erblicken der Genesis ist (wie *Trendelenburg* sagt) „*Organ der Wissenschaft*." Die wesentlichen Aufgaben, die als Hinterlassenschaft des nunmehr abgelaufenen kantischen Zeitalters der Zukunft geblieben, sind *geschichtliche*." See also Troeltsch, *Historismus und seine Probleme*, 533-536.

[14] Erwin Panofsky, "History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in Erwin Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Garden City N.Y: Doubleday, 1955), 23.

[15] Indeed Riegl's followers in the Vienna school did, while developing art history as "Strukturanalyse." See Christopher S. Wood ed., *The Vienna School Reader- Politics and Art Historical Method in the 1930s* (New York: Zone Books, 2000), 133-94.

[16] See Frederic Beiser, "Historicism and neo-Kantianism," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 39 (2008): 555.

- [17] See Richard Kroner, "History and Historicism," *Journal of Bible and Religion* 14/3 (August 1946): 131-2.
- [18] See Michael Gubser, "Max Büdinger's Universal History," *Time's visible surface- Alois Riegl and the discourse on history and temporality in fin-de-siècle Vienna* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006), 89-96; Alois Riegl, "Kunstgeschichte und Universalgeschichte [1898]," in Karl M. Swoboda ed., *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Augsburg and Wien: Filser Verlag, 1929), 4-9.
- [19] Beiser, "Historicism and neo-Kantianism," 556 ff.
- [20] Julius von Schlosser, "Alois Riegl," trans. Matthew Rampley, in ed. Richard Woodfield, *Framing Formalism: Riegl's Work* (Australia: G+B Arts International, 2001), 45; Julius von Schlosser, "Die Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte," in *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung*, XIII, 2 (Innsbruck, 1934), 193; Carl Menger, *Die Irrthümer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie* (Vienna: Hölder, 1884).
- [21] See Annette Wittkau, *Historismus: zur Geschichte des Begriffs und des Problems* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), 61-79.
- [22] See Rudolf A. Makkreell, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-kantians: The distinction of the Geisteswissenschaften and the Kulturwissenschaften," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 7 (October 1969): 423-40.
- [23] Wilhelm Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft [1894]," *Präludien: Aufsätze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*, 2 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921), 136-60.
- [24] Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* [1899] (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1986).
- [25] Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," 156.
- [26] (Unless otherwise noted, English translations are mine.) "Es gibt etwas, das nicht wirklich und trotzdem nicht nichts ist, und das daher ebenso wie das Wirkliche zur Welt gehört (...) Wir müssen das nicht-existierenden Etwas oder das *Irreale*, auch Positiv bestimmen (...)," Heinrich Rickert, *System der Philosophie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921), 112. See also Hermann Seidel, "Wirklichkeit als Alternative zum Wert," *Wert und Wirklichkeit in der Philosophie Heinrich Rickerts* (Bonn: H. Bouvier Verlag, 1968), 65-79; Guy Oaks, *Die Grenzen kultuwissenschaftlicher Begriffsbildung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 101.
- [27] "Die Unwirklichkeit ist demnach der hervorstechendste Charakterzug des Wertes als Wertes." Bruno Bauch, *Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit* (Leipzig: Meiner Verlag, 1923), 468.

[28] See Heinrich Rickert, *Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* (4 Aufl.) (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921), 151, 171-2- "Die Wirklichkeit selbst, die in ihrer unübersehbaren Mannigfaltigkeit allem Begreifen (...) könnte höchstens „irrational“ genannt werden (...).“ See also Oaks, *Grenzen kultuwissenschaftlicher Begriffsbildung*, 23-30- "Die Irrationalität der Wirklichkeit."

[29] On the place of values in neo-Kantianism, and their place in history and science of culture see Oaks, *Grenzen kultuwissenschaftlicher Begriffsbildung*, 82-110; Helmut Holzhey, "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil des Wertbegriffs in der Kulturphilosophie," in eds. Peter-Ulrich Merz-Benz und Ursula Renz, *Ethik oder Ästhetik? Zur Aktualität der neukantianischen Kulturphilosophie* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2004), 71-86.

[30] See Oskar Krauss, *Die Werttheorien: Geschichte und Kritik* (Brün-Wien-Leipzig: Verlag Rudolf Rohrer, 1937).

[31] See. H. Ganse Little Jr., "Ernst Troeltsch and the scope of historicism," *The Journal of Religion* 46/3 (July 1966): 343-64.

[32] See Risieri Frondizi, *What is a Value? An Introduction to Axiology* (Lasalle Illinois: Open Court, 1963). See also Joseph Klemens Kreibig, *Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie* (Vienna: Hödler, 1902); and Thomas Binder, "Die „Allgemein menschliche Wertungsweise.“ Joseph Klemens Kreibigs Werttheorie und Ethik," in Binder, Fabian, Höfer and Valent, *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*, 305-32.

[33] Menger, *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre*, 85-86; Menger, *Principles of Economics*, 120-1.

[34] See Robert Eisler, *Studien zur Werttheorie* (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker and Humbolt, 1902) ; Schlosser, "Alois Riegl," 48; Schlosser, "Die Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte," 193.

[35] Within that school, a debate was launched: Meinongs and his followers as Stephan Witasek and Joseph Klemens Kreibig, referred to values as the content of an emotion (Gefühl), in as much as Christian von Ehrenfels regarded values as the originators of *volitional* acts. See Kraus, *Die Werttheorien*, 165-200, 217-234; Maria Elisabeth Reicher, "Die Grazer Schule der Gegendstandstheorie," *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*, 198-201.

[36] Maria Elisabeth Reicher, "Die Grazer Schule der Gegendstandstheorie," *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*, 198.

[37] Carl Menger, *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre*, *The Collected Works of Carl Menger* Volume 1 (London: The London School of Economics, 1934), 81; Carl Menger, *Principles of Economics*, trans.

James Dingwall and Bret Hoselitz (Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007), 116.

[38] Carl Menger, "Die Lehre vom Werthe," *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre*, 77-152; Carl Menger, "The Theory of value," *Principles of Economics*, 114-74.

[39] Menger, "Lehre vom Werthe," 78; "Theory of Value," 115.

[40] See Deborah R. Coen, *Vienna in the age of uncertainty: Science, Liberalism and private life* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2007).

[41] Zerner, "Art, Value, and Historicism," 185-7.

[42] See Otto Hans Ressler, *Der Wert der Kunst*, (Wien: Böhlau, 2007); Jack Amariglio, Joseph W. Childers and Stephen E. Cullenberg eds., *Sublime economy: on the intersection of art and economics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

[43] See Erwin Panofsky, "Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art [1939]," *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Garden City N.Y: Doubleday, 1955), 38-40; Erwin Panofsky, "Zum Problem der historischen Zeit [1927]," *Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft*, 77-82; Erwin Panofsky, "Reflections on Historical Time," trans. Johanna Bauman, *Critical Inquiry* 30 (Summer 2004): 691-9.

[44] Most of the information regarding Riegl's writings on monuments is to be found in Ernst Bache ed., *Kunstwerk oder Denkmal? Alois Riegls Schriften zur Denkmalpflege* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995). See also Michael Gubser, "History and the Perception of Monuments," *Time's visible surface*, 141-50.

[45] Alois Riegl, "Entwurf einer gesetzlichen Organization der Denkmalpflege in Österreich," in *Kunstwerk oder Denkmal*, 49-144.

[46] Alois Riegl, "Wesen und Entstehung des modernen Denkmalskultus," *Kunstwerk oder Denkmal*, 52-97. The essay was published earlier, in 1928, isolated from the other parts of the "Entwurf," as Alois Riegl, "Der Moderne Denkmalskultus sein Wesen und seine Entstehung," *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 144-93.

[47] See Eisler, "Die Werttheorie als Philosophie der historische Tatsachen," *Studien zur Werttheorie*, 3-44.

[48] See Mortiz Thausing, "Die Stellung der Kunstgeschichte als Wissenschaft," *Wiener Kunstbriefe* (Leipzig: Seeman, 1884). On Thausing's art history see Gubser, *Time's Visible Surface*, 105-114-
"Moritz Thausing and the science of art history," 111-2.

[49] Menger, *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre*, 81; Menger, *Principles of economics*, 116.

[50] Riegl, "Wesen und Entstehung des modernen Denkmalskultus," 55.

[51] Riegl, "Wesen und Entstehung des modernen Denkmalskultus," 55, 60-1.

[52] See James C. Morrison, "Vico's principle of Verum is Factum and the problem of historicism," *Journal of the history of ideas* 39/4 (October-December 1978), 579-95.

[53] "Jedes Kunstdenkmal ohne Ausnahme zugleich ein historisches Denkmal ist (...) Umgekehrt ist freilich auch jedes historische Denkmal ein Kunstdenkmal." Riegl, "Wesen und Entstehung des modernen Denkmalskultus," 56.

[54] Riegl, "Wesen und Entstehung des modernen Denkmalskultus," 57.

[55] See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben* [1874] (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2009) and Diana Reynolds Cordileone, "The advantages and disadvantages of Art History to Life: Alois Riegl and historicism," *Journal of Art Historiography* 3 (December 2010), http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_183170_en.pdf .

[56] See Georg Dehio and Alois Riegl, *Konservieren nicht Restaurieren. Streitschriften zur Denkmalpflege um 1900* (Baunschweig-Wiesbaden: Wieweg, 1988).

[57] Alois Riegl, "Neue Strömungen in der Denkmalpflege [1905]," *Kunstwerk oder Denkmal*, 224.

[58] "Der Zweck eines Denkmalschutzgesetzes in Österreich ist somit der Schutz des Alterswertes der Denkmale nicht allein gegen Unverstand und Bosheit, sondern gegen alle anderen konkurrierenden Werte, insbesondere die Gegenwartswerte." Alois Riegl, "Entwurf einer gesetzlichen Organisation der Denkmalpflege," 105.

[59] "Die künftige Denkmalpflege soll gegründet sein auf den Kultus des Alterswertes, der auf dem Vorhandensein von Altersspuren beruht. Die oberste Sorge der künftigen Denkmalpflege hat sich somit auf die Erhaltung der Altersspuren zu richten, und damit müssen die Postulat der Stilursprünglichkeit und der Stileinheit, die der Kultus des historischen und des Neuheitswertes erhoben hatten und die beide zur Beseitigung der Altersspuren führen mußten, unvermeidlich fallen." Riegl, "Entwurf einer gesetzlichen Organisation der Denkmalpflege," 125.

[60] "Historisch nennen wir alles, was einmal gewesen ist und heute nicht mehr ist; Nach modernsten Begriffen verbinden wir damit noch die weitere Anschauung, daß das einmal Gewesene nie wieder sein kann und jedes einmal Gewesene das unersetzliche und unverrückbare Glied einer Entwicklungskette bildet (...) Den Kernpunkt jeder modernen historischen Auffassung bildet eben der Entwicklungsgedanke." Riegl, "Wesen und Entstehung der modernen Denkmalskultus," 55-6.

[61] Riegl, "Wesen und Entstehung der modernen Denkmalskultus," 79.

[62] See Alois Riegl, "Die Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst [1899]," in Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 28-42.

[63] See Jas' Elsner, "From Empirical Evidence to the Big Picture: Some Reflections on Riegl's concept of the Kunstwollen," *Critical Inquiry* 32 (Summer 2006): 741-66; Branco Mitrović, "Humanist Art History and its Enemies: Erwin Panofsky on the Individualism-Holism Debate," *Konsthistorisk Tidskrift* 78/2 (2009): 57-76.

[64] On the representation of empty space see Carl Siegel, *Entwicklung der Raumvorstellung des Menschlichen Bewußtseins- Eine psychologische Analyse* (Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1899), 49-50; Carl Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 75.

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The Birth of Art Criticism in the United States

by Marc S. Smith

From the early stages of the republic through the nineteenth century, the development of US art criticism was influenced by two factors. First, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States lacked cultural and artistic infrastructures. The country was almost completely devoid of museums, galleries and art schools. These lacks often pushed artists to leave for Europe to learn from masters. Benjamin West's career is a famous example of this trend. After learning painting techniques in England, he remained in London and taught to two consecutive generations of US expatriate. He is now recognized as the founding father of the US visual arts. As a consequence, a great portion of the US visual art production was done abroad. This had a direct impact on the development of art criticism.

In addition to this absence of infrastructures, the country was under the influence of the Second Awakening from the 1790s to the 1840s. The Second Awakening consisted in the renewal of strict religious values and morals, which clearly opposed and rejected English and Continental models, such as most “notably establishment religion as well as intellectual and artistic traditions[1].” This trend has since been termed as “puritanicalness[2].” The religious resurgence had a deep impact on the development of the artistic scene in the United States, on the positions of artists in society and on the properties of art criticism.

From the very beginning, art critics were immersed in a somewhat complicated situation. Many artists went abroad to learn their art and some pursued great portions of their careers in Europe. This denied critics many domestic collection and exhibit reviews. In addition, the Second Awakening and its “puritanicalness” brought religious symbolism at the heart of artistic interpretations and representations, and greatly influenced the birth of US art critics. During the Second Awakening, the first artists and critics were under pressure from preachers and reverends, while a huge portion of the population was either indifferent to the arts or in some cases openly hostile.

What were the consequences these religious dynamics had on the birth of US art criticism and the appreciation of art in society? How were art critics able to integrate religious values and interpretations, while commenting on techniques and themes deeply influenced by foreign aesthetics? How were art critics able to express themselves and develop into a modern professional category?

This article first analyzes the consequences of the Second Awakening on art appreciation and the role played by religious critics. Then, using the career of the country's first major art critic, John Neal, this study explains the way art critics were able to articulate interpretations and comments on aesthetics inside a rigorous religious context. The example of John Neal also reveals how art critics in the United States were able to slowly become modern professionals, who were able to write for specialized magazines by the 1850s.

In the colonial period, wealthy merchants in the northern and southern colonies composed the overwhelming majority of the demand for paintings. These buyers were mostly interested in portraits and around the revolution, there was a short lived demand for the historic genre. In this period, painting was a well seen career and possessing works of art was not uncommon in New England and large urban centers. There was a significant effort made by a small minority of artists and patrons to fortify American artistic traditions in art association in major North Eastern cities[3]. In addition to these wealthy collectors, the population at large was relatively open to the fine arts. In the 1790s, with the advent of the Second Awakening, things radically changed.

The public became more and more suspicious of aesthetic and literary tastes unchecked by religious standards and values. The Second Awakening brought a revival of morals which were associated to the founders of the colonies and developed a mythology around the first puritans. European artistic creations were more and more associated to the sins and corruption the Pilgrims Fathers had fled from. As Henry Ward Beecher explained: “[The Puritans] are charged with indifference to beauty, and wanton desecration of art. But what was the art which they beheld? Not harmonious lines and wealth of colour. Art is language. It came to them speaking all the abominable doctrines of oppression. The more beautiful, the more dangerous. It was a siren. Its beauty was a lure[4].” For certain preachers

and reverends, art became a tool of moral and spiritual corruption used by tyrants in the past. The main reason for this was the fact that art was based on the senses and not reason: “art stood aloft; gleaming in the tempest, radiant from thousands of pictures, silently fascinating and poisoning the soul through its most potent faculty the imagination! [...]And when the early Christian turned away from art, it was not because it was beautiful, but wicked. It embalmed corruption, it enshrined lies[5].”

Religious leaders often saw art as symbolic of a corrupt Europe. It represented aristocratic and catholic hierarchies and symbolized all the reasons why the pilgrim fathers had been correct to leave Europe: “the priest, the aristocrat, the king, had long and long been served by Art. Art was busy crowning monarchs, robing priests, or giving to the passions a garment of light in which to walk forth for mischief[6]!”

During these times of “puritanicalness”, only literature remained somewhat free. It was judged to be based more on reason and the intellect than the visual arts were. Literature was also linked to reading and the Bible, which had been the theological road to salvation for Puritans. Artworks were mostly affected by religious readings and interpretations after the 1820s and until the 1850s they were increasingly analyzed and scrutinized through a strict religious framework.

US society gave to clergymen a growing dominion over the arts and because of the need for a religious and moral validation of artworks, clergymen often acted as art critics. These religious critics rejected the aesthetics traditions that dominated in England and Continental Europe and concentrated their evaluative criteria on spiritual and religious values and their interpretative grids. Italian and French art was highly suspected because of their nudity and the papal traditional artistic patronage. By the 1820s, even the highly regarded English landscapes and portraits of the post-colonial period were little by little approached with suspicion by the public and collectors in the United States.

US artists who continued to paint in the secular tradition of their European contemporaries were more and more ignored by collectors and criticized by religious critics. Contemporary English painters who had been recognized in the US, such as John Constable,

Joseph Turner and Andrew Hunt were more and more attacked. US artists under such critics often sustained their migration to England, France and Italy and some never actually came back.

In the US, many artists were either frustrated or very angry at the fact that the replacement of aesthetic values by religious ones brought preachers and reverends on the front scene of art criticism. Artists painter William Dunlap often complained that in many of the cities he toured to exhibit his paintings, local clergy would be called upon to evaluate and judge his works[7]. They would act as art critics, but they would only look at his paintings and judge their religious content. Aesthetics, narratives and techniques were put to the side for they were indicators of the corruptive nature of art. A work of art would only be valued for the advancement it procured to the public's faith. From the 1800s to the 1840s, the majority of art criticism was amateurish and done by clergymen, but because wealthy urban merchants sustained their ties to the European art market a few professional art critics were nevertheless able to emerge.

One of the first and most famous US art critics of the time was John Neal. Neal was born in 1793 in a Quaker family and spent his childhood in Portland, Maine. The Second Awakening had slowed down the artistic development of the country, which was already greatly lacking cultural infrastructures. As a consequence, Neal was only confronted to art for the first time during his teenage years, when a shoe maker gave him an ink drawing of a face. The drawing was nothing more than a rough sketch, but it gave Neal an epiphany and brought him a life long passion for the arts.

From the ages of twelve to eighteen, Neal made a living as a haberdasher, a clerk, a dry goods dealer, a traveling penmanship tutor and as a miniature artist among other things, before entering a law school in Baltimore, Maryland in 1815. He was able to pay part of his law studies by writing in different periodicals. It is during this period that he wrote his first art review. He also helped found a literary society called The Delphian Club and he became the editor of the association's monthly newspaper titled *The Portico: A Repository of Science and Literature*. This was one of the first periodicals of the country which dealt primarily with art, but it only lasted from 1816 to 1818. At the time, Neal was both writing poems,

novels and literary reviews. By 1823, when the Second Awakening had greatly started affecting the arts, Neal left for London to perfect both his literature and art criticism.

Just like Benjamin West before him, or James McNeil Whistler after him, England became for Neal a place to get a proper artistic education and confirm his vocation. In England, he was able to secure a column in the newly published *Blackwood's Magazine* and also wrote for other leading periodicals including the *Westminster Review*. His art reviews mostly dealt with American authors published in England. During his stay, he also wrote a novel called *Brother Jonathan, or the New Englanders* which was published in England, but after a falling out with the editor of *Blackwood's Magazine* he returned to Portland in 1827[8].

Once back in the United States, he re-established his law practice and edited a short-lived literary periodical called *The Yankee*, which was widely read and diffused at the time. Through his art reviews and the personal ties he linked with the artistic community of New England, he guided many an author or artist through critique and encouragement, among them were the novelist Edgar Allan Poe[9], the sculptor Benjamin Paul Akers[10] and the painter Charles Codman[11]. From then on he established himself as a respected law practitioner, as well as an appreciated art critic. In addition to writing for *The Yankee*, he published reviews in several newspapers such as: *The Portland Illustrated*, *The Portland Advertiser*, *The Portland Magazine*, *Devoted to Literature*, *The Portland Tribune*, *The Northern Monthly*, *The Atlantic Monthly* and *Sartain's Union Magazine*. John Neal spent the rest of his life enriching the literary and artistic establishment of New England by writing art reviews and critics in regional newspapers, but he also published several articles on art theories and aesthetics[12].

The effects of the Second Awakening and the impact of religious values are clearly visible in the theories he developed at the time. Neal deemed that artistic production which stemmed from reason and order was artificial and even false. In this sense, he departed from the well implanted notion that ruled the old puritan colonies that reason was superior to the senses and only reason and thought brought one closer to God. Neal was then in rupture with the idea that the senses were portals used by Satan to have fervent Christians succumb

to corruption.

For Neal, the main goal of art was to stimulate the mind and the imagination and create an emotional response in the heart of the public. He avoided the theological explanation of the corruptive nature of art in its luxurious properties by asking for a brute art and unvarnished productions which did not hide their imperfections. In his opinion, this would stimulate “the awesome, the mysterious, the grandiose, and the obscure [and] would release a chaotic vitality in the observer[13].” Art should avoid the deception brought by overworked pieces in which the imperfections of creation were erased. Art should not be complete, clear or repose. With his own literary production, he preferred showing his unedited first drafts with all their faults than to dull their effect by proofing and rewriting. Neal made several orders to the painter Charles Codman and each time asked for pieces without high finish or indeed any finish at all[14].

In addition to asking for imperfections in art, he demanded artists show and describe in prose or painting the sublime and glory of God's nature. These were some of the effects he admired so much in Charles Codman's landscapes. As he explained: “Let a man go with me [...] out into the wilderness [...] before the hurricane breaks down upon us [...] and feel the soft air whispering about his heart; or hear the thunder breaking at his feet; and see the great trees bending and parting, in the wind and blackness of God's power-I care not who he is, or what he is- where born- or how educated- I defy him not to fall down, with his forehead in the dust, and acknowledge the presence of God[15].”

Art should reveal God's glory without pretending to be perfect. For Neal, there were no real differences between literary and visual art. All art had intrinsically the same ultimate purpose and used the same language through different modes of expression. As he explained: “Music itself is but one kind of poetry, eloquence another. Indeed it were safe to say that Music and Painting, and Eloquence, and Sculpture, and Architecture, and Poetry, are but different manifestations of the same power-interchangeable terms[16].”

John Neal had after all grown up and entered adulthood during the Second Awakening, so it is not at all surprising that God and human imperfection should take up

such an important place in his aesthetic theories. Through these two dynamics he was able to reconcile faith and art. Such a position worked well, for there is no proof that he ever entered any debates with preachers or reverends about the basis of his aesthetics theories and his art reviews were greatly enjoyed throughout the region.

John Neal was one of the very first art critics of his time. In a modern perspective, he would be termed as being an amateur or as having an amateurish approach to art. He was a part-time painter, he wrote literature all his life and wrote reviews for novels, sculptors and paintings without having any academic background or any real training. Yet, in his time, he was a well respected literary critics and became the most prominent non-clergy visual art critic of the first half of the nineteenth century.

Neal was able to approach painting with a perception almost untarnished by strict religious values. He was able to approach paintings in a way most other people were not at the time in the United States, but his religious heritage also explains why he was so much against art which he qualified as over worked. Brute productions revealed their imperfections to all viewers and could not deceive the senses. Such art did not spiritually corrupt the public. He was able to support painters throughout their careers, like Charles Codman's to whom he remained a friend during all the painter's short life. Neal helped establish Codman's reputation in New England with encouraging art reviews and in the end, Neal helped with the creation a regional New England school of painting which flourished during the second half of the nineteenth century.

In the 1820s and 1830s, most preachers and reverends still saw the visual arts as fundamentally morally corrupt and religious art critics only observed the moral qualities in art. Between the 1800's and the 1840s, many preachers improvised themselves as art critics, but a few like John Neal were able to become the very first true US art critics. In this sense John Neal appears as an original figure who was able to step out of the usual religious art criticism and its catharsis and tried to build his own methodology and analysis. Even if his theories were mostly founded on religious perceptions born from the Second Awakening, his open-mindedness allowed him to develop the country's first theories of art criticism and helped open the country to the visual arts.

The changes brought on by the Second Awakening slowly imposed themselves in the 1820s and became overwhelming by the 1840s. Apart from a few rare exceptions, art criticism was by then equal to religious interpretation. By the middle of the nineteenth century, artists began to accept these religious and spiritual conditions in the public reception of their art. Whether painters or writers, artists at large accepted the new dynamics given to art criticism and started justifying themselves and their work through transcendentalism. In an article published in 1855, in *The Crayon*, painter Asher B. Durand admonished, “it is only through religious integrity of motive by which all real Artists have ever been actuated[17].”

In his approach to nature, John Neal was in advance of his time and of the later discourses of transcendentalist reverends and preachers, who by the 1850s, and under the gradual influence of the Lewis and Clark expedition, slowly started seeing landscape painting and the pastoral as a way of glorifying God. These later generations of ministers would help the integration of the first painting school of the country, the Hudson River Valley School.

The religious influence of the Second Awakening on art criticism was felt through the 1860s. For example, the widespread influence of the Society for the Advancement of Truth in Art was made through their publication called the *Path*. The artists' newspaper would read often like a religious tract[18]. Art and religious interpretations were still closely woven in the second half of the century. The Society for the Advancement of Truth in Art did not differentiate between artistic, religious and scientific vision. They sought to humbly study and honestly represent the natural world through landscape and still life. Transcendentalist art critics packaged their arguments through grand syllogism such as “divinity is to morality as morality is to nature, and as each is to art[19].” There was no conception of an independent artist or of an art that was autonomous from religion[20].

It can be summarized, that the slow development of American art was in direct correlation with the encumbrance of standards of religious morality forced on artists. The birth of art criticism was done under the guidance of religious interpretations. The US was

devoid of a sustained philosophical tradition that ennobled art within the terms of Enlightenment critics, which coincidentally helped the US develop their own cultural identity by opposing themselves directly to Europe. American art criticism grew on Christian morality and even remained grounded on religious values from the 1850s to the 1890s when the development of the printed press, the growth of specialized art magazines and the need for more professional art critics was felt throughout the country. Not until the end of the nineteenth century would the philosophical writings of George Santayana give US art critics the intellectual tools to completely rid themselves of religious and moral interpretations[21].

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- [1] Judith Blau, "The Toggle Switch of Institutions: Religion and Art in the US in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries", *Social Forces*, volume 74, June 1996, p. 1165.
- [2] Stuart Bruchey, *The Roots of American Economic Growth*, New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
- [3] Neil Harris, *The Artist in American Society: The Formative Years, 1790-1860*, New York: George Braziller, 1966.
- [4] Henry Ward Beecher, "Puritanism", *Lectures and Orations*, dir., Dwight Hillis Newell, New York: AMS Press, 1970 [1845], p. 32.
- [5] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- [6] *Idem.*
- [7] William Dunlap, *A History of the Rise and Progress of the Arts of Design in the United States*, volume 1, New York: G. P Scott, 1834.
- [8] John Neal, *Brother Jonathan, or the New Englanders*, London: William Blackwood, 1825.
- [9] John Neal, *Wandering Recollections of a Somewhat Busy Life*, New York: Roberts Brothers, 1869, p. 256.
- [10] John Neal, *Portland Illustrated*, Portland: W.S. Jones, 1874, p.23.
- [11] John Neal, *Portland Illustrated*, Portland: W.S. Jones, 1874, p. 29.
- [12] For a fuller explication of Neal's aesthetic theories, see Donald Sears, *John Neal*, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978, pp. 29-33, and Benjamin Lease, *That Wild Fellow John Neal*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, pp. 69-80.

[13] Tracie Felker, "Charles Codman: Early Nineteenth-Century Artisan and Artist", *The American Art Journal*, volume 22, number 2, New York: Kennedy Galleries, Inc, 1990, p. 70.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[15] John Neal, *Seventy-Six*, volume 2, Baltimore: J. Robinson, 1823, p. 234.

[16] John Neal, "What is Poetry?", *Sartain's Union Magazine*, volume 4, January-June 1849, p. 11.

[17] Asher B. Durand, "Letters on Landscape Painting", *The Crayon*, volume 1, 1855, pp. 97-98.

[18] Joshua Taylor, *America as Art*, New York: Harper and Row, 1976, p. 123.

[19] Neil Harris, *op. cit.*

[20] Geraldine Pelles, *Art, Artists and Society*, New York: Prentice Hall, 1963.

[21] Judith Blau, *op. cit.*, pp. 1168-1172.

Updated on Apr 22, 2012 by [ArtHS Editor](#) (Version 5)

National Gallery, London, UK, 2012 Exhibitions

The National Gallery is planning a vibrant calendar of exhibitions in 2012 that will celebrate art and its inspiration in numerous forms and across many centuries. The year's diary ranges from an exploration of the inspiration of one of the nation's best-loved artists, J. M. W. Turner, to an exhibition of new works created as part of an exciting Cultural Olympiad London 2012 Festival collaboration with the Royal Opera House.

Visitors to the National Gallery will be able to see works that will be on display in the UK for the first time and to discover a variety of media from oil to photography.

Turner Inspired: In the Light of Claude



Joseph Mallord William Turner, *Keelmen Heaving in Coals by Night*, 1835, Oil on canvas, 92.3 x 122.8 cm, National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC, Widener Collection 1942.9.86, © Image courtesy of the Board of Trustees, National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC.

14 March – 5 June 2012

Sainsbury Wing

Admission Charge

Turner admired Claude most of all the Old Masters and enthused about the quality of light in the artist's Italian landscapes. On his death, Turner left the National Gallery 'Dido building Carthage' and 'Sun rising through Vapour: Fishermen cleaning and selling Fish' in his will on condition that they were hung between two pictures by Claude, which he named as 'The Seaport' ('Seaport with the Embarkation of the Queen of Sheba') and 'The Mill' ('Landscape with the Marriage of Isaac and Rebecca'). This exhibition brings together other closely related works by both artists, many of which share the same theme, giving visitors a chance to appreciate fully the enormous influence Claude's mastery of light and landscape had on Turner from his formative years until the end of his life.

'Turner Inspired: In the Light of Claude' is the most in-depth examination to date of Turner's experience of Claude's art and includes oils, watercolours and sketchbooks. It also

introduces visitors to the story of the Turner Bequest and its importance in the history of the National Gallery, with the final room of the show exhibiting archive material dedicated to this relationship.

‘Turner Inspired: In the Light of Claude’ is a National Gallery exhibition created in collaboration with Tate Britain.

Metamorphosis: Titian 2012

11 July – 23 September 2012

Sainsbury Wing

Admission Free


Sponsored by Credit Suisse

‘Metamorphosis: Titian 2012’ brings together a group of specially commissioned works by contemporary artists, poets, choreographers and composers in response to three of Titian’s paintings – ‘Diana and Actaeon’, ‘The Death of Actaeon’ and ‘Diana and Callisto’ – all inspired by Ovid’s poem ‘Metamorphoses’.

British contemporary artists Chris Ofili, Conrad Shawcross and Mark Wallinger will design sets for three new ballets at the Royal Opera House. The National Gallery exhibition will showcase their preparatory studies and trace the development of their designs from inception to completion. Renowned choreographers Wayne McGregor, William Tuckett and Christopher Wheeldon will collaborate with the artists to generate new ballets with original music commissioned from leading British composers. In celebration of this occasion, every member of the ballet’s company – over 100 dancers – will participate in the project. A special performance at the Royal Opera House on 16 July 2012 will be simultaneously relayed to the public on a large screen in Trafalgar Square.

In addition, the National Gallery has commissioned a group of well-known poets to explore Ovid’s text and Titian’s mythological paintings, and to respond with their own poems. The exhibition, which celebrates British artistic creativity, is a collaboration between the National Gallery and the Royal Opera House as part of the Cultural Olympiad’s London 2012 Festival.

Seduced by Art: Photography Past and Present



Ori Gersht, *Time after Time: Blow Up No. 05* [2007], Light Jet Print on Aluminium, 250 x 183 cm (98 3/8 x 72 ins), Edition of 6, © Courtesy of the artist and Mummery + Schnelle, London

31 October 2012 – 20 January 2013

Sainsbury Wing

Admission Charge

Today's photography is part of our own cultural moment, but it also arises from artistic traditions that long predate it. 'Seduced by Art: Photography Past and Present' is an engaging discussion of historical influences on both early photography of the mid-19th century and contemporary photography.

This ground-breaking exhibition brings together exceptional examples of early and contemporary photography. Works will include those by leading photographers – including Tom Hunter, Thomas Struth, Craigie Horsfield, Sam Taylor-Wood and Beate Gütschow – who trace their sources back to 19th-century photography or, in some cases, even older art historical traditions.

Across 150 years, old and new controversies are part of this story. The exhibition explores the dialogue between the history of art, the art of the 19th century and modern photographers. It also maps the development of photography as it evolved from the 19th century to reassess traditional subjects such as still life, landscape and social portraiture.

The exhibition includes works from the Wilson Centre for Photography and loans from Tate, the Victoria and Albert Museum, the National Media Museum in Bradford and directly from the artists themselves.

Titian's First Masterpiece: The Flight into Egypt

4 April – 2 September 2012

Sunley Room

Admission Free

Titian (Tiziano Vecellio; active about 1506; died 1576) enjoyed the patronage of dukes and kings during his long career and continues to be recognised as one of the greatest artists of all time.

‘Titian’s First Masterpiece: The Flight into Egypt’ examines the talented young artist’s creation of this extraordinarily ambitious and innovative work, which is believed to be one of his earliest paintings. The choice of this particular subject allowed Titian to display his precocious skills in landscape painting and reveals an already bold brushwork and exhilarating use of colour, both characteristics that would become signatures of his artistic style.

The painting, which has been generously lent to the Gallery by the Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg, will go on display after years of skilled restoration. This will be the first time the work has been seen outside Russia since 1768 when Empress Catherine the Great purchased it in Venice.

The exhibition will display this masterpiece alongside contemporary Venetian works both from the National Gallery’s collection and loans from other British collections to demonstrate how Titian adapted ideas from other artists’ work in order to create his sophisticated composition.

Touring Exhibition Programme

Titian’s Diana and Actaeon



Titian, *Diana and Actaeon*, 1556-59, Oil on canvas: 184.5 x 202.2 © Bought jointly by the National Gallery and National Galleries of Scotland with contributions from The Scottish Government, the National Heritage Memorial Fund, The Monument Trust, The Art Fund and through public appeal, 2009

2012 also sees the continuation of the National Gallery’s support for regional galleries as Titian’s masterpiece, ‘Diana and Actaeon’, commences a UK tour that takes the work to

galleries where it has never been seen before.

The painting will be on display at the Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool, 13 January – 26 February; Norwich Castle Museum and Art Gallery, 3 March – 15 April; National Museum Cardiff, 19 April – 17 June; and will return to the National Gallery for the exhibition ‘Metamorphosis: Titian 2012’.

Updated on Απρ 22, 2012 by [ArtHS Editor](#) (Version 6)

Attachments (3)

[X7424.pr.jpg](#) - on Απρ 22, 2012 by [ArtHS Editor](#) (Version 2)

[X7582 pp.jpg](#) - on Απρ 22, 2012 by [ArtHS Editor](#) (Version 2)

[Diana_and_Actaeon.jpg](#) - on Απρ 22, 2012 by [ArtHS Editor](#) (Version 2)





